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State and Local Debt Burdens in he 1980s: A Study in Contrast
Roy Babl, Georgia State University

William Duncombe, Syracuse University
ment the tremendous diversity in debt practices among states.
State and local governments have coped with major
To explain this diversity, we turn to an analysis of whether
changes in their fiscal environment during the 1980s.
institutional, fiscal, or socio-economic factors best explain this
The impact of tax and expenditure limitations (Joyce
variation
and finally to a conclusion about the implications of
and Mullins, 1991), declining federal aid (Nathan and Lago,
these results for state and local government fiscal policy and
1988), and changes in federal tax policy (Courant and

management.
Rubinfeld, 1987) all changed the calculus facing state anddebt
local
fiscal decision makers. While the effects on their tax and
expenditure structures have been studied, the impact on state
Measuring Debt Burdens
and local government debt policy and management has
Measuring and comparing long-term debt burdens has
received scant attention.
been a centerpiece of municipal credit analysis for decades.
In fact, the 1980s were a volatile time for state and local
Rating agencies, underwriters, and governments have tradidebt policy. Early in the decade, state and local governments
tionally used debt burden measures to assess the debt carrying
faced unusually high interest rates and federal tax changes
capacity of a government and the risk associated with further
that reduced the market for tax-exempt debt. These factors
borrowing (Beme and Schramm, 1986). The measurement of
encouraged the development of an array of new financing
the repayment potential of an issuer is complex and certainly
mechanisms; including zero coupon bonds, variable rate
contains a subjective element; however, the assessment of
bonds, and tender option (put) bonds (Petersen, 1982;
debt burdens is clearly a key component of credit ratings
Hamilton, 1983). At the same time, state and local govern(Standard & Poors, 1989; Moody's, 1989).1 Despite the long
ments were under pressure to reduce traditional tax financing
history associated with the use of indexes of debt burden,
(especially property and income taxes) and compete with
controversy still exists over measurement and comparison.
other jurisdictions for a shrinking pool of manufacturing firms.
The basic concept of a debt burden is generally accepted and
One of the principal vehicles of state and local economic
may be described as a simple ratio:
development policy became the use of tax-exempt debt for
private purposes. There was also an explosive growth in the
Debt Burden (DB) = Debt
Debt Carrying Capacity
use of nonguaranteed debt to fund public authorities and
enterprises (ump, 1984; Petersen, 1987; Regens and Lauth,
The debate over measuring this ratio centers around
1992). Nonguaranteed debt went from 50 percent of total
issues. What to include in the numerator, i.e., what sho
debt outstanding in 1970 to 71 percent in 1989.
included as government debt? What is the denominato

The rapid growth of tax-exempt debt for private purposes all of the income and wealth of the community or on
led to a debate over whether the federal government should part which the government can reach? Should debt bu
be subsidizing state and local competition (Kaufman, 1981). measured as a stock concept or a flow concept?
From a federal perspective, the proliferation of tax-exempt
bonds resulted in a significant loss to the federal treasury. Not What Is Government Debt?
surprisingly, key components of the federal Tax Reform Act of
Traditionally, debt burdens have focused on debt bac
1986 (TRA86) were limitations on the use of tax-exempt, and
by the full-faith and credit of the general purpose gover
particularly, private-purpose debt. TRA86 reduced the supply
This would include general obligation bonds and revenue
of private-purpose tax-exempt debt, limited arbitrage revdebt backed by government guarantees of repayment.
enues, and affected the demand for municipal bonds, particuHowever, the 1980s witnessed the rapid expansion of new
larly among institutional investors (Petersen, 1987).
debt instruments and an increasing use of public authorities to
This article examines the level and the determinants of theissue debt. How should these new forms of debt be treated in
use of long-term debt by state and local governments duringanalysis of debt burdens? A portion of the revenue bonds
the 1980s. We ask three questions: Has the distribution of may be backed by constitutional guarantees and, thus, fall
long-term debt by type, and the overall debt burden, changedunder the category of guaranteed debt. What about debt
in the last decade? What is the nature of the variation among
backed by partial guarantees, such as moral-obligation bonds?
states in these changes? Why have states chosen different lev-The U.S. Bureau of the Census in its classification of debt
els and mixes of debt burden? We discuss the difficult ques- includes in full-faith and credit debt only those issues where
tion of measuring debt burden and then use these measures tothe full taxing power of the general purpose government is
demonstrate the changing composition of debt and to docu-guaranteed for repayment.2 Moral-obligation bonds, which
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I Te most rapid growth in the 1980s was in
debt not backed by thefull-faith and credit
of the generalpurpose government.

Nonguaranteed debt for private purposes, in contrast, usually involves little risk for the issuing government. The sole
guarantee of repayment is the private enterprise that is benefiting from the project. Yet in some sense, private-purpose
debt is part of the government debt structure. First, the tax
exemption feature carries with it a required state certification
that this project is in the public interest, and, second, all such
debt ultimately is a claim on the resource base of the state.

are contingent on legislative appropriation (for any shortfall in
We will present debt burdens for all three forms of debt,
project revenue), are classified as nonguaranteed debt. We
using information published by the Bureau of the Census.
use the census definition of full-faith and credit debt for this
analysis and refer to this as general obligation or "GO" debt.3Because of classification changes, public and private-purpose
nonguaranteed debt before and after 1988 are not strictly comThe most rapid growth in the 1980s was in debt not backed
parable.4 To our knowledge, a disaggregated analysis of all
by the full-faith and credit of the general purpose government.
three debt types on a state cross-sectional basis has not been
Nonguaranteed debt can be divided into two categories,
carried out before.
depending on its end use. Debt can be issued by general govDebt burden analysis typically involves examination for a
ernment or government authorities to support public purposes,
usually capital acquisition. Public nonguaranteed debt includes single government unit, e.g., a city or a state. However, this
unit may share its tax base with other governments. For this
debt backed exclusively by project revenue (revenue bonds),
reason, the debt burden of a government should somehow
special revenue sources (special revenue bonds), and general
take account of debt issued by all dependent authorities or
appropriation. This later category may include various forms
enterprises as well as debt issued by other governments that
of capital leases between governments (lease-purchase debt)
overlay its tax base (overlapping debt). For a comparative
and business and government (certificates of participation,
study, such as this analysis of interstate debt-burden differenCOP); however, classification of leases is controversial. The
tials, the use of an overlapping debt concept is essential. To
Census Bureau, for example, includes COPs as nonguaranteed
focus separately on state or local debt would give a distorted
debt and lease-purchase agreements as debt only if a governpicture of debt burdens because states vary in the degree to
ment entity issues debt as part of the lease. Other forms of
which they have decentralized government responsibilities to
leases are included in capital or operating expenditures but not
local governments. The assignment problem is handled here
recorded as debt. We refer to this category as public nonguarby measuring the aggregate debt burden of the state and the
anteed debt or simply revenue bonds.
local governments within a state.
The second category of nonguaranteed debt includes debt
issued principally to support private enterprises. Private-purMeasuring Capacity for Repayment
pose nonguaranteed debt includes, but is not limited to,
The denominator of the debt burden ratio is the resources
industrial development bonds (IDBs) and pollution control
available to the government to repay the principal and interest
bonds to support private businesses, hospital bonds to supdue on its debt. There is general agreement that the measure
port private hospitals, and mortgage revenue bonds which
used should reflect the tax or revenue raising capacity of the
help finance housing programs (Petersen, 1987). Although
community, but there is less agreement on how this might be
this form of tax-exempt debt is now capped, and its value to
measured. At one extreme, the argument is that the right
investors reduced by federal tax reform, it still represents a
measure is the revenue raising capacity of the actual tax syssignificant share of state and local debt. For those organiza-

tions that collect government debt information, this form of tem in operation in the community. This reasoning would
debt is often the most difficult to document because the issu- lead many local governments, for example, to argue for
assessed value of taxable property as a reasonable indicator of
ing government may not have adequate records. The Bureau
of the Census has systematically collected information on thistaxable capacity.
form of debt only since the early 1980s. We refer to this cate- Others disagree, noting that "actual" capacity measures can
gory as private nonguaranteed debt.
fluctuate between communities because of assessment practices

Which forms of nonguaranteed debt should be included inor the level of tax effort exerted by the community. A government with a high tax effort may have more resources to pay off
measures of state and local debt burdens? Public nonguaranpresent debt, but less capacity to finance future debt issues.
teed debt represents a limited liability on the part of the government and, arguably, should be considered. If project revOther issues are unresolved in the measurement of debt
enues fall short of what is required to make debt payments, repayment capacity. One is whether federal grants to state
the general purpose government does not have to fill in theand local governments should be factored into the measuredifference. However, default of revenue bonds issued by a ment of a state's ability to cover its debt service obligations.
public authority could affect the credit standing of the generalSome argue that it is a recurrent source of revenue and
purpose government. The best recent example is the
although it has undergone long-term decline, it is still of
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) that
immense importance to state and local government finance.
defaulted on over two billion dollars of revenue debt in 1983.
The burden on state residents is in fact lowered by federal
Some evidence exists that the state of Washington and some
assistance. The counter argument is that the measurement of
public utilities paid an interest penalty for their association
the ability of a state to carry debt should not be contingent on
with WPPSS, at least in the short run (Jones, 1984).
the amount of subsidy that the federal government provides.
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Table 1

State and Local Government Debt Burdens
and the Composition of Debt:

Regions and Selected States, 1982 and 1989
Total

Debt

Burden Percent of Total Debt
Privae

Full- Public Purpose

income or accumulated wealth. However, personal income
does not capture many forms of imputed income and the ability of a community to "export" its taxes onto nonresidents. To
correct for this problem, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) calculates an estimate of
tax capacity for a "representative tax system" (RTS). Included
in the tax capacity estimates are business taxes such as severance taxes that may be exported. We examined debt burdens
using both personal income and ACIR tax capacity estimates
for debt capacity.5

Faith and Total Non- Non- Non-

1982 Credit Guaranteed Guaranteed Guaranteed

United States 16.0 39.9 60.1 43.5 16.6
Northwest 18.1 42.6 57.4 36.2 21.1
Connecticut 15.2 53.0 47.0 13.1 33.8

New York 22.8 37.7 62.3 48.3 13.9
Midwest 14.5 36.3 63.7 46.0 17.7
Indiana 8.0 22.2 77.8 68.3 9.5
Minnesota 20.8 45.1 54.9 29.5 25.4
South 17.1 38.1 61.9 40.1 21.7
Kentucky 24.3 13.9 86.1 57.4 28.7

Texas 15.4 45.4 54.6 49.2 5.4
West 28.6 36.1 63.9 40.7 23.2
Alaska 108.7 30.4 69.6 45.0 24.5

Oregon 32.3 81.0 19.0 10.4 8.6

Utah 28.5 19.7 80.3 53.0 27.2

1989

United States 19.2 28.7 71.3 36.8 34.5
Northwest 19.1 32.5 67.5 25.5 42.0

Connecticut 16.5 44.0 56.0 12.1 43.9
New York 23.4 30.9 69.1 39.8 29.3
Midwest 17.2 25.3 74.7 30.9 43.7
Indiana 11.5 15.8 84.2 55.0 29.2
Minnesota 24.5 33.8 66.2 23.1 43.1
South 21.4 25.2 74.8 34.2 40.6

Kentucky 27.3 6.1 93.9 40.0 53.9
Texas 24.3 34.7 65.3 37.7 27.6
West 31.6 30.2 69.8 31.6 38.1
Alaska 103.8 30.1 69.9 16.3 53.6
Oregon 24.3 74.4 25.6 13.8 11.7
Utah 47.1 12.8 87.2 65.4 21.9

A Stock or a Flow Measurement?
Should debt burdens be measured in terms of the total
amount of debt that the population must repay, or in terms of

the annual claim on available resources? The numerators in
the debt burden measure are almost always the former, some
measure of the total amount of debt outstanding. The denominators, however, are almost always annual measures, i.e., this
year's level of personal income or the yield potential of the
tax system based on this year's tax base. The disadvantage of
mixing the stock and flow concepts is that one may end up
measuring the future debt commitment at one point in time
against the current income measure, which may not reflect the
future earning power of the community. The property value
indicator of repayment capacity is consistent with a stock measure of debt, but it also may fluctuate over time.
The flow concept would measure the numerator as the
amount of principal and interest repayment required to service
the debt in the year in question. When measured against per-

sonal income or the yield of a representative tax system, it
would give a good indicator of the claim of debt on available
resources. The problem with this measure is that it does not
give an idea of how many years into the future this high or
low claim is likely to last.

The availability of data, and the conceptual strength of the
measures, make the use of the flow concept for measuring the

debt capacity more acceptable. To compare flow capacity

Note: Due to changes in the definition of public nonguaranteed and
measures
to total
debt outstanding
requires
assumption
private-purpose nonguaranteed debt
since
1987,
figures
for the
1982

that the current
performance
of the economic base,is
relative to
and 1989 are not strictly comparable.
Regional
distribution

based on an unweighted average of
distribution
for
each
thepercent
other states being
compared, will not
change
dramatically
state in the region. Total debt burden
equals
debtassumption
outstandin the future.
Thistotal
is a reasonable
in the time

ing as a percent of personal income.

frame that we are examining. The stock concept for measuring debt and the flow concept for measuring capacity, specifiAnother issue is whether the taxable capacity or revenue
cally personal income, is used as the measure of debt burden
raising capacity of a government should be adjusted to
in this article.
account for the other claims on that government's resources.
For example, suppose two states have the same level of debt
and the same revenue raising capacity, but state A is beset by
State and Local
serious social problems and a deficient infrastructure whereas
state B is not. Do the two states have the same debt repay-

ment capacity?

Government Debt Burdens

We used census debt data and these definitions of debt and
To avoid these difficult issues, many analysts and agencies
debt burdens, to profile the growth in state and local government
have turned to measurement of the underlying capacity to
debt in the 1980s. The results show that some major changes in
finance debt. The most common measures are full-market
debt structure and in the level of debt burden have occurred.
property value and personal income. Property values reflect
the base of the property tax but may not accurately measure
other potential tax bases. Personal income is a more compre-Patterns of Growth
hensive measure of the fiscal capacity of a community
First, it appears that the level of debt burden increased in
because all taxes and charges must be paid for by either
the 1980s. Total guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt increased
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Table 2

Annual Percent Change in Total State and Local Government Debt Relative to Personal
Income by Type of Debt: Regions and Selected States, 1982-87, 1987-90, and 1982-90
Total Long-Term Debt Full-Faith and Credit Debt Nonguaranteed Debt
Region and State 1982-87 1987-90 1982-90 1982-87 1987-90 1982-90 1982-87 1987-90 1982-90

United States 4.80 -3.73 1.52 -2.17 -2.77 -2.40 8.57 -4.11 3.63
Northeast 1.67 -1.92 0.31 -3.93 0.14 -2.43 4.99 -2.88 1.97
Connecticut 2.12 -0.39 1.17 -4.63 7.91 -0.11 8.05 -6.17 2.48
New York 4.66 -6.73 0.23 -1.08 4.64 -2.43 7.46 -7.55 1.57
Midwest 3.25 -3.95 0.49 -3.82 -2.03 -3.16 6.20 -4.55 2.03
Indiana 6.08 1.48 4.33 -2.91 8.71 1.30 8.17 0.17 5.10
Minnesota 5.26 -8.45 -0.11 -3.20 -0.61 -2.24 10.60 -12.19 1.43
South 5.84 -4.75 1.74 -2.81 -4.14 -3.31 9.87 -4.94 4.06
Kentucky 4.17 -6.91 -0.13 -9.55 -8.09 -9.01 5.81 -6.83 0.88
Texas 9.73 -3.45 4.59 3.77 -3.42 1.01 13.84 -3.47 7.01
West 3.52 -6.54 -0.37 0.54 -9.18 -3.22 5.00 -5.44 0.95
Arkansas 1.62 -9.72 -2.79 3.85 -15.72 -3.98 0.59 -6.93 -2.30
Oregon -1.76 -12.09 -5.77 -3.44 -12.93 -7.11 4.33 -9.74 -1.19

Utah 12.20 -6.70 4.70 3.45 -7.60 -0.84 13.98 -6.56 5.80

Note: Regional growth rates are based on an unweighted avera

* Debt burdens in
the personal
Midwest region generally
grew
from the equivalent of 16 percent
of
income
in
below the national average during the 1980s. These
to 19 percent in 1989. Much of this increase was due to the
regional trends mask some significant differences
heavy use of nonguaranteed debt in general and private-purbetween states. In Indiana and North Dakota, debt
pose bonds in particular. Nonguaranteed debt increased from
burdens grew by over 4 percent per year since 1982,
60 percent of total debt outstanding in 1982 to over 70 percent
while Nebraska and Kansas experienced declines of
in 1989 (Table 1). The pattern, however, was not one of conover 2 percent per year.
sistent increase throughout the decade.
The overall growth in total state and local debt relative to
*
personal income was quite strong (5 percent per year) during
the 1982-1987 period (Table 2) but was made up of a rapid
rise in nonguaranteed debt (9 percent per year), which more
than offset a decline in full-faith and credit debt. Not surprisingly, the primary source of growth was private-purpose
nonguaranteed debt that grew nearly 16 percent per year relative to personal income.

Six out of the sixteen southern states had growth in
debt burdens over 2 percent per year. The 4 percent
growth in North Carolina was driven by local
nonguaranteed debt while state full-faith and credit
debt actually dropped by over 13 percent per year.
In contrast, Louisiana experienced a growth in state
debt burdens of 9 percent per year but little growth
at the local level.

The expansion in debt burden has been choked off since
1987, primarily because of a 4 percent per year drop in the
outstanding amount of nonguaranteed debt. The Census
Bureau changed its classification of public and private-purpose nonguaranteed debt in 1988, hence we are not able to
identify the exact source of the decline. It is likely that the
sharp drop since 1987 is primarily in private-purpose bonds as
a result of federal tax reform. The burden of full-faith and
credit debt continued to decline in the late 1980s.

* The West was also a region of significant diversity.
Overall, debt burdens declined slightly during the
1980s because of drops in both full-faith and credit
debt and nonguaranteed debt since 1987. Four states
had growth in overall debt burdens of over 3 percent
per year, while three states had declining debt burdens of 3 percent or more per year.

Banking States by Debt Burden
We disaggregated the data to determine any underlying
The results presented in the previous section indicated a
regional patterns. In all cases, regional differences appeared
to be less important than interstate differences within the tremendous diversity in debt trends and debt composition
region. Some examples of the regional patterns and intrare- among state and local governments. As illustrated by the debt
gional variations in total debt burden and in debt composition indexes shown in Table 3, states with high debt burdens were
will give the flavor of this result.
spread throughout the country. The Northeast region fell at
about the national average in terms of total debt burdens
* Total debt burden grew faster than the national aver(Table 3), and no state in the region ranked in the top ten in
age in the South, but slower in the other three
regions (Northeast, Midwest, and West).6 All regions overall debt burdens. The highest overall debt burdens in
but the West experienced some growth in total debt 1989 were in New York and Rhode Island, 22 percent above
the national average. Comparisons by level of government
burdens in the 1980s.
show that northeastern states had much more centralized debt
* The slow growth in overall debt burden in the
Northeast was the result of substantial increases in issuance than in other regions. Two-thirds of overall debt and
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and New 75 percent of nonguaranteed debt were issued by state govHampshire, and little growth or decline in the rest of ernments, compared to 40 percent nationally (Table 3). Not
surprisingly, centralization of borrowing was a function of
the states in the region.
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geographic size, with the smaller New England states the most

Table 3

State and Local Government Debt Burdens Relative
to the U.S. Average in 1989: State Index by Region
State

Full- Private Government

Region and Faith and Public Non- Purpose Non as Percent
State Total Credit Guaranteed Guaranteed of Total

Northeast
ME 92
NH 93
VT 90
MA 94

99 111 70 121 65.1
108 71 100 63.6
108 29 148 78.3
89 59 126 74.5
129 50 112 70.8
RI 122 99 59 209 84.6
CT 86 132 28 109 77.1
NY 122 131 132 103 52.2
NJ 90 84 111 71 58.7

PA 106 119 90 111 25.8
Midwest 89 73 76 117 41.0
OH 64 71 51 74 50.0
IN 60 33 89 50 38.0
IL 74 105 39 86 48.6
MI 68 77 61 68 41.6
WI 74 133 50 49 52.5
MN 127 150 80 159 20.7
IA 64 45 52 92 32.6
MO 64 48 48 95 50.2
ND 120 77 52 227 48.8
SD 134 27 79 283 80.0
NE 134 49 258 71 23.3
KS 90 67 51 151 5.0
South 111 95 102 134 36.2

DE 168 121 67 313 76.4
MD 84 133 31 98 39.9
VA 69 65 48 83 39.2
WV 134 59 77 256 44.0
NC 83 66 110 66 20.1
SC 108 90 160 66 40.7
GA 91 75 134 59 17.9
FL 122 64 182 106 18.8
KY 142 30 155 222 39.4
TN 87 103 77 85 21.5
AL 97 118 65 114 41.5
MS 88 100 37 132 27.6
AR 83 42 61 139 38.1
LA 201 235 171 203 58.2
OK 97 51 134 95 44.7
TX 126 153 130 101 11.0
West 164 165 134 195 40.9
MT 123 69 70 226 54.0
ID 55 38 40 86 62.1
WY 184 70 41 433 39.7
CO 110 110 107 113 18.8
NM 139 75 96 238 37.8
AZ 164 141 194 151 12.6
UT 245 109 435 155 17.4
NV 116 168 90 99 34.0
WA 149 166 244 34 24.5
OR 127 328 48 43 66.2
CA 79 44 102 82 32.4
AK 540 566 239 838 53.5
HI 107 262 55 35 79.2

centralized.

Debt burdens in the Midwest were lower, on average, than
in any other region, 10 percent below the national average.
'Seven of the twelve states were in the bottom ten in terms of
overall debt burdens, primarily because of below average use
of full-faith and credit debt. In contrast, three states were in
the top 15 either due to high use of full-faith and credit debt
(Minnesota), public nonguaranteed debt (Nebraska) or private
nonguaranteed debt (South Dakota). In general, debt issuance
was decentralized in the Midwest region. Only 16 percent of
full-faith and credit debt was issued by state governments
overall and half of the state governments in the region issued
no debt of this type (Indiana, Iowa, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas).
Southern states were more diverse in their use of debt.

Three of the sixteen states were in the top ten in terms of debt
burdens (Delaware, Kentucky, and Louisiana) while one state
was in the bottom ten (Virginia). Generally, debt issuance
was quite decentralized with 40 percent or less of all types of
debt issued by the state. Texas and Florida were ranked
among the top ten states with respect to local government
debt.

The heaviest use of public debt was among western states
with debt burdens 64 percent above the national average in
1989. Six of the thirteen states were in the top ten overall in
1989 (Alaska, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, Washington, and New
Mexico), with most of these states in the top ten for both GO
and nonguaranteed debt. Alaska has consistently had the
highest debt burdens in the country for the last decade, over
five times the national average. In contrast, California and
Idaho ranked among the bottom ten in debt burdens. Debt
issuance was decentralized with 41 percent of overall debt
issued by the state governments.

The Determinants of

Debt Burden Variations
These results suggest that regional averages do not give the
right flavor of interstate variations in the debt claim on total
resources. It is not uncommon to find neighboring states with
significant differences in debt burdens, the type of debt used,
and the level of decentralization of debt management. Using
a one-way analysis of variance, we tested whether the variation between regions was more important than the variation
among regions in (a) debt burden, and (b) the composition of
debt. The results did not show a significant regional effect.7
What these results told us was that the determinants of
interstate variations in debt burden were more state than

region specific. We developed an a priori model of debt burden determination and then tested it on cross-section data for
state and local governments for the 1988-1990 period.

The Determinants

Note: State and local debt burdens (debts outstanding
personal income) by state relative to U.S. average which is set
The dependent variable we proposed to explain was the
equal to 100. Regional index is an unweighted average of indexlevel of debt outstanding as a percent of personal income.
es for each state in the region.

The burden was measured for the aggregate of a state and its
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local governments. The dependent variable was specified as
all four of the debt burden measures considered above: total
debt, the sum of general obligation and public-purpose
nonguaranteed debt, general obligation debt, public-purpose
nonguaranteed debt.

The other side of this story is that states with
a less expansive view of the role of government

Borrowing to some extent from the literature on the
should choose lower debt burdens.
demand for local public services (Bahl, Johnson, and
Wasylenko, 1980; Inman, 1979), we considered four hypothePublic nonguaranteed debt is likely to be influenced by
ses about why some states chose a higher debt burden than
demand for services provided by public authorities such as
others.8 We expected that debt burdens would (a) rise with
utilities. We tested the relationship between per capita energy
the demand for services, (b) be higher in states with "big govconsumption (billions of BTU per capita) and state and local
ernment" tendencies, (c) be a function of the mix of debt
debt burdens (U.S. Department of Energy, 1991). Heavy debt
instruments used, and (d) change little over time relative to
financing also characterizes public water systems. Using inforother states and be related most closely to historic levels of
mation on per capita domestic water consumption (thousands
debt. The independent variables were estimated for 1988 to
of gallons per day per person in 1985), we expected that high1990 unless otherwise indicated.

er water consumption was also associated with higher debt

Service Demand. The first hypothesis was that higher debt burdens (U.S. Geologic Survey, 1985).9
burdens were associated with a growth in demand for those
Expansionary Government. The second hypothesis was
government services that required heavy capital expenditures.
that governments that have a tradition of spending at a high
Most prominent among these services are highways, schools
level-providing a broad array of public services-would be
and colleges, utilities, parks, and hospitals. The demand for
services is also impacted by the budget constraint, the amount more willing to take on a higher level of debt burden. We
expected a positive relationship between the per capita level
of revenues that the state and local governments can raise to
of state and local government current expenditures in a given
cover the costs of the capital financing.
year and the level of debt burden.
We included three sets of indicators to capture the demand
The other side of this story is that states with a less expanside effects. Population size (in millions) and population den-

sity (hundreds of persons per square mile) reflect the generalsive view of the role of government should choose lower debt

demand for services brought on by larger populations and by burdens. We hypothesized that such states were more likely
greater rates of urbanization. The growth rate in population to have strict tax, expenditure and debt limits. A negative relaover the past five years reflects the pressure to increase infras-tionship was expected between the level of total and GO debt

tructure spending. We expected that population growth and burden and the existence of such limitations. We also expecturbanization would increase the rate of capital spending anded to find that fiscal limits promoted the use of nonguaranteed
therefore the debt burden. The effect of population was less debt in that they played to a basic belief that services ought to
clear because the higher demand for services in larger states be supported by beneficiaries.
might be dominated by the economies of size associated with
We constructed several variables to measure the level of
providing services with heavy fixed costs.
state debt limits. Using Hackbart and Leigland's (1990) excelTo measure the budget constraint, we included real per
lent review of state debt management in 1988, we constructed
capita personal income in the state, and the per capita level ofa 6-point scale to measure state GO debt limitations. A score
federal grants received. We expected that states with a higherof 1 denoted states with only simple majority legislative
per capita income (in thousands) would demand more public approval of borrowing while a score of 6 indicated states
services and debt (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1991) where GO debt was limited to casual deficits or financial
and would raise a higher level of taxes to support this debt. emergencies.10 Using information from NASBO (1987), we
States with higher levels of federal grants, cet. par., should bewere able to identify those states in 1987 that had restrictions
able to afford greater levels of capital services.
on other forms of debt, such as revenue bond limitations.
A series of variables were used to proxy the demand for We also considered the relationship between debt burdens
certain services that were more heavily capital intensive, and and state tax and expenditure limitations (Advisory
each should have been positively associated with the level of Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1988 and
1991).11 The hypothesis we investigated was that nonguarandebt burden. We expected that states with high per capita
enrollment in public schools and colleges would have a higherteed debt may be used by some governments as a way to
avoid the constraints imposed by a tax and expenditure limitademand for debt to finance educational facilities (U.S.
tion (TEL).
Department of Education, 1991). Because highway expenditures are a significant part of debt issues, we expected debt
Debt Mix. A third hypothesis was that the level of debt
burdens to go up with highway utilization, thousands of vehiburden was related to the mix of debt chosen. One scenario
cle miles per person (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1988,
was that GO and revenue debt were perfect substitutes in
1989 and 1990). Another major category of state capital expenwhich case there was no relationship between the mix of pubditures is for state parks and recreational facilities. We proxied
lic-purpose debt and total debt burden. Another view was
state park demand with state park acres per square mile of
that the availability of revenue debt and private-purpose debt
state land in 1989 (National Association of State Park Directors,
allowed state and local governments to supplement what they
1990). We expected these demand factors to exert a positive
raised from GO bonds. In this case, the more they made use
influence on both the total and the GO debt burden.
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Table 4

Analysis of State and Local Government Debt Burdens by Type of Debt, 1988-90
Total Debt Total Government Debt Full-Faith and Credit Debt Public Non-Guaranteed

Intercept

-0.1895* -0.0298 0.0329 0.1634*
(-2.041) (-0.495) (1.140) (3.635)
1977 debt burden 0.1470* 0.0984* 0.3412* 0.1009*
(3.313) (3.414) (10.656) (2.230)
Private purpose debt as percent of total -0.0124 -0.2396* -0.0525* -0.1442*
(-0.378)

(-11.270)

(-4.918)

(-6.168)

Current expenditure burden 0.7452* 0.2079 0.2232* 0.0086
(2.962) (1.273) (2.909) (0.046)
State general obligation debt limit -0.0058** -0.0034** -0.0008
(-1.857) (-1.682) (-0.773)
State revenue debt limit -0.0586* -0.0433* *-0.0120* -0.0200*
(-5.413) (-6.157) (-3.365) (-2.389)
State tax expenditure limit 0.0135 0.0117 0.0166*
(1.193)

Population

-0.1067

(1.588)

-0.0592

(-1.188)

(5.112)

-0.0957*

(-1.014)

0.0405

(-3.207)

(0.595)

Population growth 0.3792* 0.1960* 0.0207 0.0542
(3.764) (2.996) (0.687) (0.727)
Population density 0.0145* 0.0097* -0.0016 0Q0059*

(4.727) (4.869) (-1.645) (2.692)
Real per capita income -0.0062** -0.0044** 0.0015 -0.0110*
(-1.700) (-1.869) (1.412) (-4.528)
Per capita college students 1.7699* 1.1781* 0.7623**

(2.827)
(2.898)
(1.671)
Per capita school enrollment 1.0446* 0.9673* -0.1229
(2.878)

(4.104)

(-1.176)

Per capita energy consumption 0.1778* 0.0615* 0.0025
(3.927) (2.092) (0.071)

Per capita water consumption 0.1661 0.1353 0Q3074*
Per

(1.182)
(1.482)
(3.565)
vehicle miles -0.0018

capita

Adjusted
Note:

Each

R2

.495

Ordinary

cell

reports

.698

Least

(-1.163)

.724

Squares

regression

.404

regression

coefficients

* Statistically significant from zero
** Statistically significant from zero
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The specific demand factors (public school and college
enrollments, per capita water consumption and energy use)
The stringency of a state's debt limit appears to
generally raised the level of debt burden. A significantly higher
level of consumption of energy or water, or greater enrollments,
negatively affect the level of total debt and public
tended to make overall debt burdens significantly higher. This
was true for total debt and for total government debt. These
nonguaranteed debt. There may exist a general
indicators of service use appeared to be more closely related to
the interstate variation in government nonguaranteed debt (revenue debt) than that in general obligation debt. The coeffiantidebt climate in some states that discourages
cients on the school enrollment and highway usage variables in
the GO equation were actually negative, although neither was
allforms of debt.
statistically significant from zero at the 10 percent level.

and lead to substitution of nonguaranteed debt.17 This sugThe results for the population density and the population
gests that the reaction of state and local governments to TELs,
growth rate variables were significant and positive for most
categories of debt burden. Greater levels of population density at least in terms of debt policy, is a more complicated one.
tended to increase debt burdens, and higher rates of populaThe results on the relationship between the mix of debt
tion growth were associated with a greater debt claim on perand the level of debt burden do not show that states that
sonal income. Based on these estimates, a state with popularesort to more use of nonguaranteed debt systematically carry
tion density of 100 persons per mile above the national
a higher debt burden. In fact, our analysis suggests that GO
average, cet. par., would be expected to have a debt burden
and nonguaranteed debt are substitutes. In addition, state and
that claimed a 1.4 percent higher share of personal income;
local governments within a state appear to substitute privateand an average population growth rate that had been 1 perpurpose nonguaranteed debt for government debt.
cent higher over the past five years meant a debt burden that
Finally, there is the question of the influence of historic
would be a .37 percent greater share of income.
debt levels. Our results here show clear support for this arguStates with larger populations and higher per capita perment. Current levels of debt burden are significantly influsonal incomes did not incur greater debt burdens. In fact,
enced by debt decisions that were made far in the past. The

when all else was accounted for, these states had significantly
lagged variable is significant for every measure of debt burlower debt burdens. The results for population size suggested den, and is especially important for full-faith and credit debt.
weak economies of size with respect to capital intensive services such as highways and utilities. As we discuss later, the
negative relationship between income and debt burdens sugConclusions
gested that borrowing was not constrained by capacity to
finance debt.
Much has been written about the explosion of state and
local government debt in the 1980s, and the extent to which
The argument for the expansionary government effect also
this was attributable to the usage of nontraditional forms, i.e.,
appeared to hold up. A higher level of current expenditures,
nonguaranteed public and private debt. The level of state and
ceteris paribus, was associated with a higher total debt burlocal debt rose from 16 percent of personal income in 1982 to
den.16 The bond limit variables also had the expected effect
over 19 percent in 1989. However, since 1987, there has been
of dampening the total level of debt burden. An increase in
a pullback, especially in the issuance of private-purpose debt,
the stringency of the state GO debt limit from category 4 to
as a result of tax reform, new limits on certain types of debt,
category 5, for example, was associated with a .6 percentage
and fiscal limits in states.
point reduction in total debt burdens. The existence of a state
revenue debt limitation was especially powerful with a 6 per- This study examined the interstate variation in this trend in
an effort to identify the determinants of debt burden variations
centage point drop in total debt burdens.
among the states. The results showed that changes in the
Our results are generally consistent with past empirical
level of debt burden in the 1980s can be partially attributable
research on public debt that has focused on the impact of
to increases in the demand for capital intensive services, and
debt limits (Bunch, 1991; Farnham, 1985; MacManus, 1981).
the preference of a state for a generally larger role for its govGenerally, these studies have found that state-imposed limitaernments.
tions on state or local general obligation debt has reduced
issuance of both GO and nonguaranteed debt and may have
Although results have to be thought of as tentative, at best,
led to the proliferation of public authorities. Our results sug-because of limitations in the data, the possible policy implicagest that the stringency of a state's debt limit appears to nega- tions are important. First, if public-purpose and private-purtively affect the level of total debt and public nonguaranteedpose bonds are substitutes, as is suggested by these results,
debt. There may exist a general antidebt climate in some
then the capping of private-purpose bonds will not significantstates that discourages all forms of debt.
ly reduce the level of tax-exempt debt chosen by state and
local governments. Instead, governments are likely to issue
We also found a positive relationship between state tax
more GO and public nonguaranteed debt to ultimately supand expenditure limitations and the level of total government
port private purposes.
and GO debt burdens. The results for full-faith and credit
debt run counter to the view that TELs discourage GO debt
Second, demand factors and institutional constraints rather
issuance because debt payments will come from general taxes,
than capacity to finance seem to have driven the level of debt
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burdens. Poorer states, we found, tend to have a larger debt
burden than richer states after all other factors are taken into
account. These results imply that federal aid, especially for
capital projects, will be used primarily as a substitute for borrowing and may not lead to a significant increase in infrastructure spending. Our findings highlight the need for states to
rethink debt policy in terms of their fiscal capacity. In this
regard, it is important in future research to establish whether
poorer states are avoiding present fiscal constraints by offloading high-debt burdens onto future generations. Closely relat5.
ed, debt limits appear to be associated with significantly lower
levels of debt burden, but that tax and expenditure limitations
have the opposite effect.

breakdown of debt by type and issuing government. The definitio
the different categories were confirmed based on a number of tele

conversations with census officials, who were careful to point out p
tial inconsistencies in the time-series definitions. The principal inc
tency involved the definition of public nonguaranteed debt and pr
nonguaranteed debt. Beginning with 1988, the private-purpose cat
included debt (primarily for private hospitals) previously classified a
lic nonguaranteed. In addition, Census officials felt that state recor
private-purpose debt improved with the passage of TRA86. Thus, p
the apparent growth in private-purpose debt since 1988 may be fr
more complete reporting.

We did not find major differences between relative debt burden
either personal income or the RTS tax capacity measure, so we use
sonal income since it is available on an annual basis. A good review of
the issues surrounding the measurement of fiscal capacity is presented in

This area begs for more research. Problems exist with the

conceptual measurement of debt burden and with the data
collected to make this measurement. No formal model exists
of the political process that leads to the debt versus tax decision, and careful case-study work is needed on the relationship between the level of debt chosen and the types of debt

U.S. Department of Treasury (1985) and Ladd and Yinger (1989).
6. We calculate unweighted regional means in this article. Because this
approach gives each state an equal weight, it is more consistent with our
emphasis on intraregional variation.
7. The F-statistics estimated from the ANOVA by region for the different debt

burden measures and the variables measuring distribution of debt by type
were not statistically significant from zero at the 5 percent level. The one

factor where there appeared to be a regional effect was in centralization
of debt issuance at the state government level. The ANOVA was carried

instruments used.

out for the four major census regions; Northeast (9 states), Midwest (12

Roy Bahl is a professor of economics and public administra- states), South (16 states), and West (13 states).
tion and director of the Policy Research Center at Georgia State8. While the empirical literature on state and local government debt deciUniversity. He has authored numerous books and articles on sub- sions is relatively sparse, a fairly large theoretical literature examines the
optimal level of municipal debt and capital spending and the impact of
jects related to state and local finance. His research on the New
state imposed debt limitations. This literature has produced mixed results
York economy dates back to the early 1970s, and he and William
on the "rationality" of local debt decisions and the need for debt limitaDuncombe are the authors of Economic Growth & Fiscal
tions (for example, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1989; Epple and Spatt, 1986).
Planning: New York in the 1990s (New Brunswick, NJ: Center
for we would have made a detailed adjustment of energy and water
9. Ideally,
Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1991).

William Duncombe is an assistant professor of public
administration and senior research associate, Metropolitan
Studies Program, at The Maxwell School of Syracuse
University. He has published articles in the area of fiscal
health, government costs, and budgeting in state and local
governments.

usage to reflect the amount of utility services delivered by public vs. private utilities. Unfortunately, data were not available for this adjustment.

10. The scale is as follows: (1) simple majority legislative approval of borrowing (MD, NH, TN, and VT); (2) extraordinary legislative approval required
(DE, IL, LA, MA, MN, MT); (2) voter approval required for borrowing (AK,
AR, FL, MI, NM, NY, PA, OK, VA, WA); (4) flexible debt limits which are

tied to growth of some other factor such as property values (CT GA, HI
NV, NJ, NC, SC, SD, UT, WI, WY); (5) fixed dollar limit on debt (AL, CA,
CO, ID, KS, ME, ND, OR, RI); and (6) GO debt limited to casual deficits or
Notes
financial emergencies (AZ, IN, IA, KY, MS, MO, NE, OH. TX, WV). We
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments created
of Steven
the scale from a more detailed breakdown of debt limits in
Gold and anonymous reviewers for Public Administration Review. Hackbart and Leigland (1990).
11. Most
states
impose some sort of restriction of local GO borrowing and
1. Early research on factors influencing bond ratings found debt
ratios
to be
some
have local TELs. We also constructed variables to measure the strinthe primary determinants (Bahl, 1971; Rubinfeld, 1973). Rating
agencies

gency
of the
came under heavy criticism in the mid-1970s for the 'black box"
nature
oflocal GO debt limitation, the requirement of a local debt refand the existence of a local TEL. These limit variables were not
this process. Since that time, rating agencies have been more erendum,
open about
found to
significantly affect the combined state and local debt burden so
rating decisions, and it is fair to say that significant improvements
have
wereof
dropped
been made in the quality of the rating process. Recent studies
bond from the final model. A discussion of these variables and

the empirical
ratings have found economic factors to be particularly important;
howev-results are available from the authors upon request.
er, debt ratios are still significant (Cluff and Farnham, 1985). 12. New York has long carried a heavy burden of short-term debt that must

be financedon
every spring. This would be a major political issue in most
2. Until 1987, the Bureau of the Census published information separately
states,
New York voters seem to have long ago discounted the effects
GO debt and guaranteed revenue debt for state governments.
GObut
debt
of debt
this practice.
For a good discussion of short-term deficit borrowing in
accounted for 82 percent of state government full-faith and credit
in
Newstates.
York, see
that year, while guaranteed revenue debt was only used in 13
ItGreen (1991).

13. The
includes three years of data (1988 to 1990) for all states
accounted for 25 percent or more of full-faith and credit debt
in 7sample
states,
except
Alaska, which was dropped because it was an outlier (sample size
with Ohio (74 percent), Oregon (91 percent), and Virginia (81
percent)
particularly heavy users.
of 147). We used a pooled, time-series approach because the additional
observations
may make it easier to identify important factors affecting
3. The Bureau of the Census calculates a measure of "net debt"
which
Theand
years 1988 to 1990 were selected because the definition of
excludes all forms of "self-sustaining debt" such as sinking debt.
funds
reserve funds and most forms of nonguaranteed debt. Becausenonguaranteed
this mea- debt by the Bureau of the Census was consistent during
sure is only calculated for the state government level and that
because
it test whether we could pool these observations, we used an
time. To
ignores most nonguaranteed debt, it was not used in this article.
F-test ofIn
structural
a
change in the intercept and slope coefficients of the
sense, other forms of long-term commitments, such as unfunded
final pension
regression equations (Johnston, 1984). We could not reject the null
liabilities, are a form of debt placed on future generations. hypothesis
We do not
at the 5 percent level that all three years come from the same
underlying population.
take this broader view of debt primarily because of data limitations.

4. The basic source for the debt data that we used is an unpublished
14. The basicdata
method we used was ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
file provided by the Bureau of the Census. These data include We
a detailed
checked for heteroscedasticity with a White Test and could not reject
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the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level that there was no heteroscedas-

vol. 17 (January), pp. 34-47.

Hackbart, Merl and James Leigland, 1990. 'State Debt Management Policy: A

ticity problem. We checked for multicollinearity in the final model and

National Survey." Public Budgeting & Finance, vol. 10 (Spring), pp. 37-53.

did not find any problem except between per capita income and the inter-

Hamilton, Randy, 1983. "The World Turned Upside Down: The Contemporary

cept, since per capita income does not fluctuate very much. We kept this
variable in the model, but it is likely that its standard error is biased

Revolution in State and Local Government Capital Finance." Public

upward. Finally, we checked for nonlinear relationships using residual

plots with key independent variables and did not find a specification

Administration Review, vol. 43 (January/February), pp. 20-31.
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas and Harvey Rosen, 1989. "The 'Rationality' of Municipal

problem. We also fit the model in double-log form as an alternative. The

Capital Spending: Evidence from New Jersey." Regional Science and

Urban Economics, vol. 19 (August), pp. 517-536.

fit of this model was much poorer than for a linear specification.
15. Variables dropped from all the final models included per capita federal

Inman, Robert, 1979. "The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments: An

grants, state park land, and local debt limits and TELs. The variables for

Interpretative Review.' In P. Mieszkowski and M. Straszheim, eds.,

state TELs and per capita vehicle miles were dropped from some of the

Current Issues in Urban Economics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins

models. We also checked for interaction effects between the debt limit

University Press.

variables and other key independent variables such as population, population density, population growth, and per capita income. All of the interaction terms were statistically insignificant, except the relationship

between population and state GO debt limits. The coefficient on the
interaction term is negative and the coefficient on population becomes

Johnston, J., 1984. Econometric Methods, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co.

Jones, L. R., 1984. "The WPPSS Default: Trouble in the Municipal Bond

Market." Public Budgeting and Finance, vol. 4 (Winter), pp. 60-77.
Joyce, Philip and Daniel Mullins, 1991. 'The Changing Fiscal Structure of the

positive. Although the interpretation of this result is not straightforward, it

suggests that more populated states may be less likely to use stringent
debt limits. Because of the tentative nature of these results, we have not
used this model in this article. However, in future research in this area

253.
Jump, Bernard, 1984. "State and Local Government Fiscal Condition, Credit
Strength, and the Market for Municipal Debt: A Mid-Decade Assessment."

such interaction effects should be carefully considered. The regression

Proceedings of the Seventy Seventh Annual Conference. Columbus, OH:

results for the full model and the interaction model are available from the
authors upon request.

16. Because borrowing will lead to increase operating expenditures to finance
debt service payments, we used current expenditures minus interest payments as our measure of expenditure burden.

17. Although tax limitations, especially on local property taxes, have been

State and Local Public Sector: The Impact of Tax and Expenditure
Limitations." Public Administration Review, vol. 51 (May/June), pp. 240-

National Tax Association.

Kaufman, George, 1981. Efficiency in the Municipal Bond Market: The Use of
Tax Exempt Financing for 'Private'Purposes. London: JAI Press.
Ladd, Helen and John Yinger, 1989. America's Ailing Cites Fiscal Healtb and
the Design of Urban Policy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.

around for many years, the passage of Proposition 13 in California signaled
MacManus, Susan, 1981. "The Impact of Functional Responsibility and State
a new interest in more comprehensive limitations particularly at the state
Legal Constraints on the 'Revenue-Debt' Packages of U.S. Central Cities."
level. A growing literature focuses on the impact of TELs, not only on the
InternationalJournal of Public Administration, vol. 3 (1), pp. 67-111.
size of government, but on the revenue and expenditure structures of state

Moody's Investors Service, 1989. Moody's on Municipals. New York: Moody's

and local governments (see Joyce and Mullins, 1991). In this literature, some
research links the existence of a TEL to the shifting of debt usage from GO

Investors Service.

National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), 1987. Budgetary
to nonguaranteed debt. Most of this research is descriptive in nature and
Processes in the States. Washington, DC: NASBO.

focuses generally on property tax limits at the local level during the late
National Association of State Park Directors, 1990. 1990 Annual Information
1970s (for example, MacManus, 1981). Sharp and Elkins (1987) find only
Exchange. Austin, TX: National Association of State Park Directors.
mixed support for this hypothesis in their study of seven cities in Missouri.
Nathan, Richard and John Lago, 1988. "Intergovernmental Relations in the
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